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EMBRACING THE QUEEN OF HEARTS: DEFERENCE TO
RETROACTIVE TAX RULES
JAMES M. PUCKETT*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.
United States underscored the importance of a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action; accordingly, the Court clarified that tax administration is generally
subject to the same review as other kinds of administrative action by other federal agencies.
Tax guidance from the IRS and Treasury Department serves an important role in clarifying
the tax law so that taxpayers may report their tax liability accurately and plan their affairs.
Meanwhile, aggressive attempts by a relatively small number of taxpayers to avoid tax liability by exploiting arguable ambiguities in the tax law present a perennial challenge for tax
administration. In either case, as long as statutory and regulatory ambiguities exist, some
surprises in the form of retroactive resolutions of uncertain tax positions are inevitable; the
issue is who decides? Because of the Internal Revenue Code’s unusual grant of retroactive
rulemaking power to the Treasury Department, tax administration cannot simply be collapsed with all other administrative action into a uniform framework of judicial review. This
Article attempts to shed light on judicial review of more typical prospective tax guidance in
part by drawing from the special case of retroactive tax guidance. This Article also argues
that the general approach to judicial review of administrative action, as infused by the Code’s
express grants of retroactive rulemaking power, affords the IRS and Treasury flexibility to
make policy retroactively through rulemaking and receive deference from the courts. Moreover, though some constitutional limitations on retroactivity exist, the retroactive administrative clarification of an ambiguity should not be unconstitutional. Finally, this Article briefly
assesses strengths and weaknesses of the current regime and the principal alternatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions concerning tax administration in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States1 and United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC2 have
attracted considerable scholarly attention.3 Though the move in Mayo
was somewhat anticipated by an extensive prior literature,4 it is now
clear that tax scholars and practitioners cannot escape mining the
relatively opaque doctrines that lie at the heart of general administrative law. In Mayo, the Court rejected the idea of a tax-specific approach to judicial review.5 This clarification calls for a fresh look at a
variety of issues of tax administration, because the IRS historically
has operated on the assumption that tax administration is special.6

1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
2. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
3. See Matthew H. Friedman, Reviving National Muffler: Analyzing the Effect of
Mayo Foundation on Judicial Deference as Applied to General Authority Tax Guidance, 107
Nw. U. L. Rev. COLLOQUY 115 (2012); Steve R. Johnson, Mayo and the Future of Tax Regulations, 130 TAX NOTES 1547, 1547 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Future of Tax Regulations]; Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32
VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2013); Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and
Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643 (2012); Andrew Pruitt, Judicial
Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558
(2011); Patrick J. Smith, Omissions from Gross Income and Retroactivity, 131 TAX NOTES
57 (2011); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondents, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No.
11-139) [hereinafter “Hickman Brief”].
4. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343 (1991); Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines:
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1740-59 (2007) [hereinafter Hickman,
Coloring Outside the Lines]; Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax
Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239; Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead:
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 6 (2006).
5. 131 S. Ct. at 713 (“Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less
deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the
rules of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve
out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have
expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’ ” (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))).
6. See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered, 134 TAX NOTES 35, 35
(2012) (“The tax world finally recognized a stark fact of life in 2011: Tax law is not special.
It took an explicit Supreme Court statement for the tax bar to become aware of its run-ofthe-mill status, but that statement has prompted soul-searching on what litigation and
administrative rules must be learned and followed.”). As Professor Hickman has established in detail, the IRS often fails to give notice and comment, may not make a plain
statement of the regulation or respond adequately to comments, has overused APA exceptions to notice and comment, inappropriately labeled legislative regulations as interpretative, and has often purported to cure deficiencies retroactively by undertaking notice and
comment at final stage of regulations. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4,
at 1740-59 (discussing methodology and results of empirical study of Treasury regulations).
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A year after Mayo, the Supreme Court in Home Concrete7 had another opportunity to clarify issues at the intersection of tax and administrative law. The Court’s narrow opinion does little to squarely
answer broader questions relating to tax administration.8 Nevertheless, Home Concrete does provide insight into the thinking of at least
four Supreme Court justices on temporary Treasury regulations and
retroactivity issues.
Issues left open by Home Concrete include questions surrounding
the validity and force of retroactive tax rules. For example, should
courts apply Chevron deference9 to retroactive10 Treasury regulations
and Auer11 deference to IRS interpretations of existing tax guidance?
In addition, after Mayo, the uncertain application of general administrative law doctrines carries over to prospective rules enacted by the
IRS and Treasury. Given the unusual provisions of the Internal Revenue Code concerning the retroactivity of tax rules,12 a complete
analysis of prospective tax rules must be entwined to some extent
with an analysis of retroactive rules.
Prospective tax guidance provides notice and clarity to taxpayers
planning their affairs and must anticipate a bewildering variety of
transactions. Tax guidance takes many forms, compounding the complexity of the framework for judicial review of such guidance. Inevitably, however, there are gaps in the guidance. A recurring theme in
tax administration that intersects with retroactivity issues is how to
7. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 153-65.
9. When Chevron deference applies, a reviewing court must uphold an agency’s reasonable resolution of an ambiguity or gap in the relevant law, even if the agency’s interpretation is not the best possible interpretation. See infra text accompanying notes 73-86.
10. Courts and commentators have struggled to define “retroactivity.” This Article’s
use of the term relates to “primary” retroactivity, as opposed to “secondary” retroactivity,
as explained in the following typology:
1. Imposition of new legal standards with regard to past transactions or occurrences
in the context of determining:
a. the legal consequences of those past transactions or occurrences for the period up
to the effective date of the new statute or agency rule (“primary retroactivity”); and
b. the legal consequences of those past transactions or occurrences for the period
beyond the effective date of the new statute or rule. Justice Scalia characterized this variety of retroactivity as “secondary retroactivity.”
2. Imposition of new legal standards for transactions or occurrences after the
effective date of the statute or rule for the purpose of determining legal
consequences for the future (also included within Justice Scalia’s notion of
“secondary retroactivity”).
William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 157.
11. The Auer deference doctrine requires a court to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless plainly erroneous, even when adopted in a relatively
informal manner, such as in a brief filed during litigation. See infra text accompanying
notes 98-107.
12. See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012).
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deal with taxpayers who attempt to exploit the ambiguities of the tax
law by engaging in transactions with little or no purpose beyond generating tax benefits.13 Such a taxpayer would hope to use an aggressive, literalistic reading of the Code or other authorities to produce
a deduction or generate deferral where none is intended by Congress.14 There are also, of course, many situations in which taxpayers
take aggressive interpretations of the tax law with respect to non-tax
motivated transactions.
Retroactive guidance can prevent unfair windfalls that are arguably permitted by gaps in prospective guidance. Obviously, another
method of filling gaps in prospective guidance is for a court to decide
a question. Judicial clarification of the law will generally take effect
retroactively. However, an aggressive taxpayer would hope for a generalist court to substitute its judgment for the expert judgment of the
IRS. If, however, it is established that retroactive Treasury regulations are entitled to Chevron deference, the mere threat of such retroactive regulations may deter abuse.
There is also a potential for overreaching by the government, and
some observers will object to Chevron deference for retroactive
rules.15 That approach is too skeptical, but a completely permissive
approach to retroactivity also is unwarranted.16 Perhaps some regulatory tools that are appropriate to use against a tax shelter participant are not fitting for the average taxpayer,17 nor do our concerns
for the average taxpayer equally map onto tax shelter participants.
Although some attempts at retroactive tax administration would be
unlawful or unconstitutional, there is flexibility for a good deal of retroactive tax rulemaking. Accordingly, this Article sketches options to
limit deference to retroactive tax rules.

13. See Joshua D. Blank and Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1641, 1647 (2012) (providing a brief overview of corporate tax abuse).
14. See id.
15. See Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251, 1253
(2011) (criticizing the tax bar’s myopia in ignoring retroactivity jurisprudence); supra
note 3, at 1578 (proposing that Congress eliminate Chevron deference for retroactive
Treasury regulations).
16. See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity,
94 GEO. L. J. 1015 (2006) (noting ambivalence of courts and scholars toward retroactivity
despite “modern approach” embracing retroactivity). But see Michael J. Graetz, Legal
Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49-63
(1977) (both prospective and retroactive tax changes alter asset values and upset expectations); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
517-19 (1986) (generally equating economic effect of prospective and retroactive change).
17. Cf. Emily Cauble, Making Partnerships Work for Mom and Pop and Everyone
Else, 2 COLUM. TAX J. 247, 250-51 (2011) (proposing simplified partnership tax regime,
which would be “more suitable for unsophisticated partnerships and make the law
less prone to exploitation by sophisticated partnerships,” noting that “undue focus on the
needs of unsophisticated partnerships leads to rules that are ripe for manipulation by
sophisticated taxpayers”).
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Part II describes certain general administrative law requirements
governing agency action and the principles of judicial review of agency action. Part III discusses the implications of these fundamental
principles for tax rules (including regulations, temporary regulations,
and revenue rulings). The analysis takes into account the Code’s unusual grant of retroactive rulemaking power to the Treasury Department. Part III concludes that final Treasury regulations should
ordinarily receive Chevron deference; temporary Treasury regulations and revenue rulings should be reviewed under the less deferential Skidmore standard. The conclusion remains the same whether or
not the rule is retroactive. Part IV anticipates potential constitutional challenges to retroactivity, observing that the Constitution affords
agencies, including the IRS, substantial flexibility to make policy retroactively. Part V sketches a tentative appraisal of the current state
of affairs as well as the principal alternatives.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY ACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Part summarizes certain fundamental principles governing
agency action and judicial review of agency action. This broader administrative law context is key to examining the implications of Mayo’s
mandate to apply uniform principles of judicial review of agency action
to tax administration.
A. Modalities of Administrative Action and
Procedural Requirements
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), agency action is
generally quite flexible.18 The modalities of agency action include
rulemaking and adjudication.19 Rulemaking includes formulating interpretations of general applicability and future effect implementing,
prescribing, or interpreting law or policy.20 Adjudication includes trial-like determinations as well as a variety of actions that are not trial-like; the residual category of agency action that is not rulemaking
is adjudication.21
1. Procedures
Rulemaking and adjudication may be conducted informally, unless
a hearing on the record is specifically required by statute.22 Where a
18. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2006).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), (7) (2006).
20. Id. § 551(4)-(5).
21. Id. § 551(6)-(7).
22. Id. §§ 553(c) (rulemaking), 554(a) (adjudication), 555 (ancillary matters); Florida
E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 224, 237 (1973) (noting that a “hearing” requirement, without more, does not trigger formal procedures); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We will henceforth make no presumption that
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statute requires a hearing on the record, the APA imposes a variety
of trial-type procedures on the agency, such as fact finding by an independent administrative law judge (or the head of the agency itself),
a ban on ex parte contacts, and a requirement that facts must be adduced exclusively from the record established in the hearing.23
Rules further divide into two principal categories: interpretative
rules and legislative rules. Legislative rules must be promulgated
through procedures allowing for prior notice and comment by the
public, while interpretative rules as well as general statements of
policy need not undergo notice and comment.24
The distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules
has always been fuzzy.25 This Article’s working definition is that both
types of rules bind the agency and the public, but interpretative rules
could fairly be described as construing the relevant statutory text or preexisting agency guidance, rather than setting forth a new rule that
could not fairly be deduced from the statute or pre-existing guidance.26
This working definition appears to be the modern trend in cases
and general administrative law scholarship.27 Professor Hickman,
however, appears to reject this distinction as unconvincing “rhetoric”28
a statutory ‘hearing’ requirement does or does not compel the agency to undertake a formal
‘hearing on the record,’ thereby leaving it to the agency, as an initial matter, to resolve the
ambiguity.”). But see Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977) (“In
summary, the crucial question is not whether particular talismanic language was used but
whether the proceedings under review fall within that category of quasi-judicial proceedings deserving of special procedural protections.”).
23. Id. §§ 556-557.
24. Id. § 553(b).
25. Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules:
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1994) (noting “ineradicable confusion” in the area
of legislative versus non-legislative rules); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking
and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 382 (“The nonlegislative rule exemptions in
the federal APA have proved difficult to apply in practice and have been the subject of constant litigation.”); Morgan Douglas Mitchell, Note, Wolf or Sheep?: Is an Agency Pronouncement a Legislative Rule, Interpretive Rule, or Policy Statement?, 62 ALA. L. REV. 839
(2011) (surveying cases).
26. See Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2005);
Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165
(7th Cir. 1996); Anthony, supra note 25, at 12-14. Cf. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Health &
Safety Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (articulating a four-part test, an important factor of which is “whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or
ensure the performance of duties”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules
from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000) (approving of American Mining factors). But see Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1987) (testing for binding
effect on the agency).
27. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 73-74 (5th
ed. 2012) (“More recent decisions have taken the more literal view . . . that the test for invoking the interpretive rule exemption is whether the pronouncement really interprets
existing legislation (or a pre-existing legislative rule).”).
28. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4, at 1770 (“Some who defend
the interpretative label . . . turn to rhetoric often employed by the courts that legislative rules
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and would instead put controlling weight on whether a rule is binding on the agency and the public.29 Professor Manning, however, explains that if “an agency wishes to promulgate a more binding directive, it may use an ‘interpretative rule.’ ”30 Moreover, Manning classifies the policymaking-versus-interpretation distinction as fundamentally a “question of degree.”31
2. Choice of Modality
These APA categories sketch a general administrative law skeleton, while various organic enactments specify the role, powers, and
limitations of the various executive agencies.32 Congress often allows
an agency to use all the basic modalities (i.e., rulemaking or adjudication, of either formal or informal cast) to enforce the law and make
policy.33 On the other hand, an act may instead require a specific modality for certain kinds of agency action, mandate hybrid procedures,
or disallow certain modalities entirely.34
Under longstanding precedent, courts have allowed agencies to
choose freely the modality (rulemaking or adjudication) through
which to make policy where consistent with the relevant organic
act.35 Procedural play in the joints is extremely helpful, if not absolutely necessary, in the administration of complex laws. This flexibility
has another side, however. In some sense, executive agencies are effectively exercising executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial
powers.36 This concentration of power in one body is in tension
with separation of powers values. The Supreme Court, however, has
allowed the concentration of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in an agency.37 This may be due to judicially unmanageable
line-drawing issues.38

‘create new law, rights or duties,’ while interpretative rules merely state ‘what the agency
thinks the statute means.’ ”).
29. Id. at 1771.
30. See Manning, infra note 38, at 916.
31. Id. (comparing to the nondelegation and rulemaking-versus-adjudication inquiries).
32. Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for
the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 506-15 (1995) (classifying
statutory limitations on agency discretion, e.g., purposive limits, subject-matter limits, procedural prerequisites and limits, limits on standard setting, and limits on regulatory method).
33. See LUBBERS, supra note 27, at 4-6.
34. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 205
(1994) (finding that Congress sometimes requires rulemaking in hopes of avoiding agency
capture); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (1986) (noting a modern trend toward rulemaking).
35. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
36. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 32, at 539-42 (summarizing how separation of
powers theory has shaped the structure of administrative law).
37. In Withrow v. Larkin, the Court explained:
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Delegation of “breathtakingly broad” quasi-legislative power to an
agency is common in organic acts.39 This has not always been uncontroversial. As Professor Manning writes, “proponents of a strong
nondelegation doctrine maintain that important legislative policies
should have to survive the more democratic, deliberation-enhancing
process of bicameralism and presentment prescribed by Article I,
Section 7.”40 Indeed, in the early days of the administrative state, the
Court invalidated statutes on the ground that Congress impermissibly delegated legislative authority to an executive agency.41 Later decisions have, however, made clear that Congress may delegate to
agencies the power to make policy so long as there is an “intelligible
principle” limiting the delegation.42
Moreover, many agencies may also exercise broad adjudicatory
powers consistent with their organic act. An agency adjudication
may involve finding facts, applying existing rules, and formulating
new policies. Such powers are a standard feature of modern agencies

The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative
adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative
powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to
be adequately implemented.
421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948) (observing
that “the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex
parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents’ basing point practices”); Wilkins & Hunt,
supra note 32, at 541-42 (“The nondelegation doctrine by itself is of limited significance,
as are the principal vestiges of the strict separation-of-powers view remaining in our
administrative jurisprudence.”).
38. See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894-95
(2004) (“Lacking any judicially manageable standards to determine how much conferred
discretion is too much, the Court essentially leaves it to Congress to determine how precise or vague its organic acts should be. Second, similar considerations emerge (though
less explicitly) from the Court’s cases governing an agency’s choice between rulemaking
and adjudication.”).
39. See Manning, supra note 38, at 897; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 866 (2001).
40. Manning, supra note 38, at 897.
41. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“In the
history of the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two
statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the
other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more
precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’ . . . In
short, we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’ ”)
(citations omitted).
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despite potential objections concerning separation of powers, procedural due process, and retroactivity.43
3. Retroactivity Issues
The drawbacks of this latter potential feature of adjudication—the
agency’s formulation of a new rule simultaneously applied to a party
that has already undertaken conduct burdened by the new rule—is
an old theme in administrative law. In theory, agencies could be required to announce new policies only prospectively, but the Supreme
Court has never suggested that such a requirement exists.
In the classic Chenery II case, the Court considered whether the
SEC could adopt a new policy through adjudication or whether the policy could only be adopted through rulemaking.44 The Court acknowledged that all other things being equal, rulemaking would be preferable; the choice, however, was left with agencies:
[A]ny rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the
specialized problems which arise. Not every principle essential to
the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must
await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet
particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important
functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency
must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other
is to exalt form over necessity.45

Thus, Chenery II clearly chose agency flexibility over a general norm
against retroactivity.46

43. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own guidance “has inverted a
basic feature of our constitutional structure by presuming that Congress’s delegation of
lawmaking power to agencies intrinsically includes a delegation of agency power to say
what its own ‘laws’ (i.e., regulations) mean.”); Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 32, at 540
(“[T]here is a strong sense in traditional administrative theory that where the same body
has simultaneous executive, legislative, and judicial power over the same subject matter,
or where a non-legislative body gains substantial policymaking power, it creates serious
unaccountability or even tyranny.”); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative
Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 488-89 (2010) (“Although the
Court has rejected the claim that combining investigative and adjudicatory functions necessarily violates due process, it has also acknowledged the possibility that such a combination
may undermine an individual’s due process right to an unbiased decision-maker.”).
44. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In Chenery I, the Court had remanded
the matter to the SEC, refusing to uphold the SEC’s order on grounds that the agency did
not actually rely upon in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 196. The SEC then reexamined the
matter, reaching the same conclusion on different grounds. Id.
45. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
46. See id.
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Retroactivity more typically arises from agency adjudications or
enforcement decisions, but retroactive rulemaking is another possibility.47 Although an agency’s authority to adjudicate can be inferred
from a broad delegation of responsibility to an agency, retroactive
rulemaking authority must be expressly authorized.48 Thus, agencies one way or another will often have occasion to make policy
retroactively, and may be able to do so through adjudication or
rulemaking—or simply by deciding what circumstances merit
enforcement of an unclear provision.
It is unclear whether retroactivity should present an additional
administrative law hurdle or only a potential constitutional claim.49
Courts have certainly found retroactive application of new rules to be
an abuse of discretion by the agency. For example, the D.C. Circuit in
Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB denied retroactive
enforcement of an order of reinstatement and back pay based on the
following factors:
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether
the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established
practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of
law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule
is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden
which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory
interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on
the old standard.50

The Supreme Court’s signals have been mixed, but this multifactor approach to retroactivity in agency adjudication seems out of
step with the Court’s latest pronouncements on the issue. In Bell
Aerospace, the Court permitted the NLRB to determine through
adjudication—contrary to the Board’s prior decisions—that buyers
constituted a collective bargaining unit and direct a representation
election.51 However, the Court in dictum observed that retroactivity
could be precluded in a case where a party suffers “substantial” harm
for actions taken in “good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements.”52
On the other hand, in Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court held that
47. Indeed, tax rules were initially retroactive by default. See Mitchell Rogovin &
Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity in
the 21st Century—A View from Within, 87 TAXES 21, 23 (2009).
48. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
49. See infra Part IV for a discussion of constitutional issues raised by retroactive
tax guidance.
50. Retail, Wholesale, and Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 291-92 (1974).
52. Id. at 295; see also Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12 (1984)
(refusing to adopt a “flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the
Government” and noting that this “principle also underlies the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude
upon reasonable reliance interests.”).
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courts may not require agencies to follow additional procedures beyond
what Congress has required in the APA and the organic act.53 Moreover, the Court’s first decision in FCC v. Fox54 indicates clearly that
courts should not subject administrative action to higher scrutiny than
the APA requires in order to avoid reaching constitutional issues.55
Fox I involved the FCC’s departure from a past policy of leniency
with regard to fleeting expletives in broadcasts.56 Among other incidents of indecency at issue, Fox broadcast the 2003 Billboard Music
Awards, in which Nicole Ritchie made indecent remarks.57 The FCC
announced a new policy in adjudication that even fleeting expletives
would not be tolerated. The Court held that “the Commission’s new
enforcement policy and its order finding the broadcasts actionably
indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious. . . .”58 The Court
found “no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more
searching review.” 59
The Court remanded the case for further consideration of First
Amendment issues.60 But the Court clearly indicated that the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard should not be transformed, even
in light of potential First Amendment concerns. “If [broadcasters]
mean to invite us to apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-capricious
review to agency actions that implicate constitutional liberties, we
reject the invitation.”61
When the case reached the Supreme Court again, the Court invalidated the Commission’s standard on vagueness grounds without
reaching the First Amendment issues.62 As the Court explained, “A
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws . . . must give
fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”63 Vagueness, accordingly, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
when “conviction or punishment” is obtained under a “statute or regulation” that “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or
53. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
523-24, 543-44 (1978) (refusing to require additional procedures for informal rulemaking
beyond those specified in the APA).
54. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I), 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
55. See Metzger, supra note 43, at 483 (noting that “the Court expressly refused to
link ordinary administrative law to constitutional concerns”).
56. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 510.
57. In the words of Nicole Ritchie, “Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada
purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.” Id.
58. Id. at 517.
59. Id. at 514.
60. Id. at 530.
61. Id. at 516.
62. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012).
63. Id. at 2317.
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encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”64 This standard
would, however, appear to leave leeway for agency changes of position if there is no “punishment,” or if change is more in the nature of
clarification or otherwise foreseeable.
4. Arbitrary and Capricious Limitation
The arbitrary and capricious standard65 is a general limitation on
all agency action, but it is “narrow.”66 As the Court explains in Fox I,
the arbitrary and capricious standard is not a license for the court to
substitute judgment for an agency’s weighing of various factors.67
It is, instead, a requirement that an agency consider relevant factors
and arrive at a conclusion in a reasonable manner. An agency’s
failure to consider relevant facts would lead to a finding of arbitrary and capriciousness, but a reasonable—even if not the most
desirable—conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious.68 To be sure,
arbitrary and capricious review of agency action is less deferential
than the rationality review that courts apply when considering due
process challenges to economic legislation. Courts will not supply
reasons that the agency did not actually rely upon in making its decision, and the level of scrutiny more generally has evolved to what
scholars call “hard look.”69 Nevertheless, the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review remains an extremely deferential one.
The arbitrary and capricious standard serves as a useful transition from the present discussion of general principles of agency action
under the APA to the following discussion of principles of judicial review of agency action. The arbitrary and capricious standard lies
between the primarily procedural APA requirements and the primarily substantive judicial review doctrines. The standard is primarily
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
66. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513. (“Under what we have called this ‘narrow’ standard of review, we insist that an agency ‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action.’ ”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
67. Id. at 513-14 (“We have made clear, however, that ‘a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency,’ and should ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’ ”) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
68. Id. at 515-16 (“Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon
factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior
policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would
be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is
needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the
prior policy.” (citations omitted)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (providing the standard definition of
what the arbitrary and capricious standard of review requires of an agency).
69. See Metzger, supra note 43, at 490-94 (summarizing “hard look” review).
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process-oriented (did the agency consider relevant factors?) but also
incorporates narrow substantive elements (was the consideration
reasonable?). Moreover, the arbitrary and capricious standard reappears as part of Chevron deference. Nevertheless, it may be useful to
think of the arbitrary and capricious standard as a limitation on validity of agency action ab initio; if an agency action is arbitrary and
capricious, it is invalid under the APA. Nevertheless, even if an
agency action is valid under the APA, depending on the applicable
deference regime, a court may reject the agency’s position.
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action
If an agency has acted validly under the APA, the next question is
whether a court will accept or reject the agency’s interpretation.
Congress regularly delegates authority to executive agencies either
explicitly or by enacting ambiguous laws. Courts have typically afforded some degree of deference to the positions of an agency charged
with implementing the relevant statute. This deference regime to
some extent respects separation of powers and comparative institutional advantage at policymaking.70 There is a continuum of judicial
deference to agency action. Some types of agency interpretations
will be entitled to little or no deference, while other types of agency
interpretations merit near absolute deference.
1. Scope of Chevron and Skidmore Deference
Skidmore deference lies toward the weak end of the deference continuum.71 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that the position of
an agency is entitled to deference to the extent the position is persuasive, taking into account such factors as “the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”72 The weight of these
factors for or against an agency is highly dependent on the context
surrounding an agency’s adoption of a position. Thus, Skidmore deference is on a “sliding scale” and could be quite strong.
While Skidmore establishes the baseline for judicial deference to
agency interpretations, certain types of agency interpretations
merit stronger deference. In Chevron,73 the Court set forth74 a more

70. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 124-25, 139-49 (1994) (comparing advantages of
agencies versus courts); cf. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 39, at 865-66 (discussing the
idea that deference is a second-best solution to the nondelegation doctrine).
71. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
72. Id. at 140.
73. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
IN
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deferential two-step framework, the precise scope of which remains
unclear almost three decades later.75 Under Chevron, a reviewing
court must first consider whether Congress has “directly addressed the
precise question at issue.”76 If the statute does not directly address the
precise question, then at step two the court defers to an agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.”77
When Chevron deference applies, the court’s review virtually collapses into arbitrary and capricious review.78 Arbitrary and capricious review generally interrogates whether an agency has engaged
in reasoned consideration of the factors relevant to the matter at
hand. The agency must always consider what the relevant statute
provides; an interpretation that is contrary to the statute would not
be a reasonable one. Thus, although the Court’s doctrine as well as
the APA79 separately state inconsistency with the statute as grounds
for invalidation of agency action, an agency position manifestly contrary to the statute should be analytically merged into the concept of
arbitrary and capricious.
The scope of Chevron deference remains unclear.80 As the Court
explained in Mead, Chevron deference applies when “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”81 Moreover, the
delegation to the agency may be express or implied. As the Court explained, even in the absence of an express delegation to implement a
particular provision, “it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force
of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in
the enacted law . . . .”82
The Court appears to have supplied a Chevron safe harbor to agency
action undertaken in the form of notice and comment rulemaking as

74. This may overstate the Court’s move; some would say that the Court to some extent clarified a pre-existing deference regime and expanded it to additional types of agency
action. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1241-42 (2007).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 80-93.
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
77. Id. at 844.
78. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating “analysis would be
the same” under Chevron step two and APA arbitrary and capricious review).
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006) (reviewing court shall set agency action “in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”).
80. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 74, at 1246-48.
81. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
82. Id. at 229.
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well as formal adjudication.83 But, the Court has never adopted a
bright-line rule that Chevron deference only applies to notice and
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. Although the Court’s
repeated praise for those modalities is difficult to dismiss, it is just as
difficult to dismiss the Court’s explicit disavowal of a bright-line rule.84
Indeed, the Court has deferred to other types of agency action.85
The central thesis of Mead is that Chevron deference respects a
legislative intent to delegate primary interpretive power to an executive agency rather than the courts.86 Accordingly, it would seem that
notice and comment rulemaking and formal adjudication may really
just be shortcuts for finding a delegation of gap-filling authority. In
Barnhart v. Walton, the Court specified other factors that tend to
show delegation deserving of Chevron deference: “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time . . . .”87
Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman’s examination of Mead and
Barnhart as applied by the lower federal courts reveals that
some courts concentrate on whether an interpretation binds more
than the parties at hand; some broaden this analysis to ask whether, in addition to binding effect, the interpretation reflects public
participation; some limit their focus to whether an agency interpretation reflects careful consideration; and some expand this focus,
weighing careful consideration along with agency expertise and
statutory complexity.88

Bressman persuasively argues that these readings are only “half
right”; the analysis should partake of both binding effect (the promise
of consistency underlying Mead) and careful consideration (factors
stressed in Barnhart).89 Crisply stated, “we should restrict Chevron

83. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31.
84. See id. (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority,
the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required
and none was afforded.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
85. See NationsBank of N.C. N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 251
(1995) (Comptroller of Currency’s informal determination granted Chevron deference); see
also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 39, at 884 (“However, the Court has not explained in
any of these decisions why, consistent with the underlying logic of delegation, an agency
should be entitled to mandatory deference when it interprets a statute in a procedural
format that does not otherwise have the force of law.”); id. at n.250 (citing additional cases).
86. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
87. See 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
88. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1459 (2005).
89. Id. at 1488.
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deference to procedures or interpretations that reflect transparency,
rationality, and consistency.”90
Binding agency authority will often emerge through notice and
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, but not necessarily. For
example, an APA exception for “good cause” allows an agency to delay notice and comment otherwise required for the promulgation of
legislative rules.91 In addition, a rule that binds the agency and the
public might be interpretative and therefore not necessitate notice
and comment.92 Such an interpretative rule might, depending on the
agency’s procedures, undergo substantial consideration at the agency
that fosters “fairness and deliberation” even if not notice and comment under the APA.93
2. Changes in an Agency’s Position
A related line of cases concern the implications for judicial deference to changes in an agency’s position—from an agency or a court’s
prior interpretation of a statute. It is irrelevant to Chevron’s scope
whether an agency’s position has changed over time.94 Moreover, an
agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference even if it is contrary to
a prior decision of a court so long as the relevant statute is ambiguous as to the precise question at issue.95 If the court has held that the
statute is unambiguous, then the agency has no power to change the
interpretation. It is an open question whether even a Supreme Court
decision can be reversed by a new agency interpretation.96 Taken together, these rules prevent “ossification” of initial decisions by an

90. Id. at 1492.
91. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (2006).
92. See sources cited supra note 26 (discussing difficulty of distinguishing interpretative
rules from legislative rules).
93. Cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232-34 (finding that classification rulings were somewhat
precedential, but subject to further agency review, did not apply to the public, and were
being “churned out” at the rate of 10,000 per year); Krzalic v. Republic Tile Co., 314 F.3d
875, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing a “perfunctory” HUD policy statement from an
earlier HUD policy statement that was the product of “meeting with government representatives plus a broad range of consumer and industry groups”).
94. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13
(2011) (“[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a ‘regulation was prompted by
litigation.’ Indeed, in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838
(2001), we expressly invited the Treasury Department to ‘amend its regulations’ if troubled
by the consequences of our resolution of the case.” (citations omitted) (quoting Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996).
95. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows
from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 153-61 (explaining why Home Concrete has not
changed this understanding of Brand X).
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agency or a court, and allow agencies the flexibility to adapt policy
over time without seeking statutory change.97
3. Deference to an Agency’s Interpretation of its Own Guidance
Courts also defer to an agency’s interpretation of the agency’s prior guidance that is offered in the course of litigation, unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent.”98 In Auer, the
Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation presented in
an amicus brief.99 The Court held that adoption of the interpretation
in a brief did not, “in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference.”100 The Court noted that “[t]he Secretary’s position
is in no sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency
seeking to defend past agency action against attack.”101 As the Court
explained, “There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question.”102
Auer deference has been criticized for allowing self-delegation by
agencies and creating improper incentives against careful rulemaking. For example, Professor Manning argues that Auer deference allows agencies to substitute statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity and conflates lawmaking with law exposition.103 Moreover,
Justice Scalia also appears to have embraced that critique:
When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the
implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that
implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise,
legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it
leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial
determination of the rule’s meaning.104

The agency’s interpretation may not undergo any formal process or
be open to comment from the public.105 Thus, these interpretations

97. See Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s
Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 206 (2009); Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” The Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
98. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
99. Id. at 461-62.
100. Id. at 462.
101. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)).
102. Id.
103. See Manning, supra note 43, at 654-74.
104. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
105. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1483-84 (2011) (discussing the “wide variety of forms” in which agencies have adopted interpretations of prior interpretations of a statute).
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may avoid the “pay me now or pay me later” principle;106 they also
raise retroactivity issues.
Nevertheless, Auer deference has been affirmed many times, including in recent Supreme Court opinions.107 Perhaps this should
come as no surprise, given the Court’s refusal to limit Chevron deference to relatively formal agency guidance. If nonlegislative rules and
informal adjudications may sometimes receive Chevron deference,108
then the avoidance of the “pay me now or pay me later” principle is a
much larger phenomenon.
III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES TO
TAX RULES
This Part integrates the general administrative law principles
previously discussed into the specific context of tax administration,
especially retroactive or litigation oriented guidance. The Supreme
Court recently had occasion in Mayo109 and Home Concrete110 to clarify
several issues of tax administration. In Mayo, the Court signaled an
end to tax exceptionalism in administrative law, absent special justifications.111 Home Concrete, as will be explained, was narrowly decided
and left unanswered many of the important questions presented.
The discussion proceeds by type of guidance, including final regulations, temporary regulations, revenue rulings, and position statements in briefs filed during litigation. I assume that general statements of policy and other non-binding guidance, such as private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and the like are not eligible
for any deference.
A. Final Regulations
Pre-Mayo, it was unclear whether Chevron or the tax-specific National Muffler precedent applied to judicial review of Treasury regulations.112 National Muffler, unlike Chevron and essentially like
Skidmore,113 applied a sliding scale of deference based in part on the
106. Id. at 1464 (“This ‘pay me now or pay me later’ principle has gradually emerged as
a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid direct regulation of agency
choice of policymaking form while retaining some form of meaningful check—either ex ante
procedural safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny—on administrative decisions.”).
107. See, e.g., Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2261 (2011); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy,
131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011). However, the Auer precedent has recently shown signs of weakening. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012) (holding
Auer does not apply when there is unfair surprise from the agency reversing its position).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
109. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
110. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
111. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
112. Id. at 712.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
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consistency of an agency’s interpretation over time and whether it
was adopted in response to litigation.114 Therefore, retroactive or litigation-prompted tax rules would have fared comparatively poorly
under the standard articulated in National Muffler.115 Mayo, in contrast, disavows tax exceptionalism and holds that Chevron deference
applies to notice and comment Treasury regulations.116
In addition, the IRS has historically claimed that many of its rules
are interpretative; however, Mayo rejects the general authorityspecific authority distinction that the IRS typically has cited in
promulgating regulations.117 After Mayo, it is clear that notice and
comment final regulations should receive Chevron deference. Mayo
does not, however, hold that all regulations are legislative rules. The
leading test, though a question of degree and subject to much valid
criticism, is whether the authority really interprets an existing statute or guidance, or whether instead the agency’s position cannot follow from a process of interpretation.118
Mayo does not reject that test; it does indicate that general authority versus specific authority is not the correct inquiry under
Chevron.119 Professor Lubbers writes that it is entirely consistent
with Mead for an interpretative rule to be bootstrapped into Chevron
eligibility when the agency voluntarily uses procedures that Congress
would intend to generate deference.120 As a unanimous Supreme
Court explained in Long Island Care at Home, when a rule
sets forth important individual rights and duties, where the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses

114. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)
(“In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in
a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it
is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have
been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner
in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.”); see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United
States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that National Muffler was less deferential
than Chevron).
115. But see Johnson, Future of Tax Regulations, supra note 3, at 1552 (arguing
that the application of these factors could only increase, not decrease, deference to the
government’s interpretation).
116. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-13 (“[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a
‘regulation was prompted by litigation.’ Indeed, in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001), we expressly invited the Treasury Department
to ‘amend its regulations’ if troubled by the consequences of our resolution of the case.”
(citation omitted)).
117. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
119. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
120. See LUBBERS, supra note 27, at 467.
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full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule . . . and
where the rule itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes
that Congress intended it to defer to the agency’s determination.121

Thus, the Court reversed the Second Circuit’s holding that a rule was
interpretative and therefore ineligible for Chevron deference.122 It is
not entirely clear, however, whether the Court agreed with the Second Circuit that the rule was interpretative.
Mayo clearly approves of agency changes in position over time,
even when prompted by litigation, but what about the problem, not
presented in Mayo, of retroactivity? What if, for example, the regulations defining “student” status had been made effective beginning
two years prior to the promulgation of the rule?
At a glance, Section 7805(b)(1) appears to establish a general rule
against regulations taking effect before the public has notice of the
expected contents of the rules the regulations will contain.123 The current version of Section 7805(b), however, only applies to “regulations
which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after [July 30,
1996,] the date of enactment of this Act.”124 Prior to amendment, Section 7805(b) expressly allowed the Treasury to “prescribe the extent,
if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.”125 Although
the effective date clause’s meaning is contested,126 the IRS’s position
is that this permissive standard applies to regulations relating to
much of the Code.127 Moreover, even in the case of regulations relating
to post-1996 Code sections, regulations may take effect retroactively to
“prevent abuse.”128
There is a circuit split as to whether an agency’s interpretation of
jurisdictional rules receives deference.129 Thus, it is an open question
whether the IRS and Treasury’s decision to apply regulations retro121. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007).
122. Id. at 172.
123. In general, tax regulations may not take effect before the earlier of: the date on
which such regulation is filed with the Federal Register; the date on which any proposed or
temporary regulation to which such final regulation relates was filed with the Federal
Register; or the date on which any notice substantially describing the expected contents of
any temporary, proposed, or final regulation is issued to the public. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2012).
124. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(b), 110 Stat. 1468 (1996).
125. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (1994).
126. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 674 n.179 (noting ambiguity as to whether the
date modifies the enactment of regulations, or the enactment of statutes).
127. See T.D. 9511, 2011-1 C.B. 455.
128. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (2012).
129. See Arlington v. FCC, 688 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting circuit split on the
question), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7807 (2012); Bressman, supra note 87, at 147274. The Supreme Court has not given direct guidance on the issue, but in at least two cases
has answered arguably jurisdictional questions on plain meaning grounds, thereby obviating the deference question. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
142 (2000); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).
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actively under pre-1996 Section 7805(b) or under the prevention of
abuse standard would receive deference.
One might object that the notion of a retroactive rule is simply
nonsensical. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen asserts
that under the APA there is no such thing as a retroactive rule.130 As
Justice Scalia argues, adjudication is retroactive, whereas rulemaking has prospective effect.131 What this dichotomy misses is the possibility of overlap. If guidance is of general applicability and both retroactive and prospective effect, then it does have prospective effect.
In any event, it should not be necessary to pigeonhole the idea of a
retroactive tax rule into the APA’s definition of rulemaking. The
Court has held that Congress may choose the procedures for agency
action, creating hybrid procedures distinct from the APA. For example, in Florida East Coast Railway, the Court approved of a procedure for certain boxcar tolls requiring both rulemaking and a hearing.132 Section 7805(b) clearly contemplates the possibility of a rule
the effective date of which precedes the rule’s promulgation.
Assuming a retroactive regulation is procedurally valid, what
standard of judicial deference applies? The central thesis of Mead is
that if Congress would expect courts to defer to the agency’s filling a
gap with the type of guidance at issue Chevron applies.133 Mayo has
held that notice and comment Treasury regulations merit Chevron
deference.134 It makes little sense that Congress would not expect the
same deference for the retroactive regulations that it has authorized in
Section 7805(b). Indeed, retroactivity in and of itself has not been a
reason to withhold deference outside the tax context: courts defer to an
agency’s position adopted in formal adjudications and to an agency’s
interpretation of its own guidance adopted in a brief filed in litigation.135
130. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216-17 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The only plausible reading of the italicized phrase is that rules have legal consequences only for the future. It could not possibly mean that merely some of their legal consequences must be for the future, though they may also have legal consequences for the
past, since that description would not enable rules to be distinguished from ‘orders,’ and
would thus destroy the entire dichotomy upon which the most significant portions of the
APA are based. (Adjudication—the process for formulating orders—has future as well as
past legal consequences, since the principles announced in an adjudication cannot be departed from in future adjudications without reason.”) (citation omitted)).
131. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216-19.
132. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245-46 (1973) (“Here, the
incentive payments proposed by the Commission in its tentative order, and later adopted
in its final order, were applicable across the board to all of the common carriers by railroad
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. No effort was made to single out any particular
railroad for special consideration based on its own peculiar circumstances. . . . The factual
inferences were used in the formulation of a basically legislative-type judgment, for prospective application only, rather than in adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts.”).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
134. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
712-13 (2011).
135. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).

370

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:349

Professor Lederman proposes that the facts surrounding the issuance of guidance, including retroactivity and unfair delay, should be
a factor in arbitrary and capricious review under either Skidmore or
Chevron, whichever is applicable.136 In the context of Chevron deference, which would apply to notice and comment regulations, Lederman would take this into account as part of the arbitrary and capricious review of Step 2.137 Though the proposal is analytically sound, I
would emphasize the limits of the test. It is unlikely that a clarification, even if retroactive, would be invalid.138 The principal challenge
for the Treasury would appear to be changing a clear and firmlyestablished interpretation retroactively; in some instances, this could
be arbitrary and capricious or, possibly, void for vagueness.139
B. Temporary Regulations
The IRS often has issued temporary regulations without notice
and comment, finalizing the regulations after subsequently receiving
comments (the “interim-final” method).140 Professor Hickman has
criticized the interim-final method, arguing that it ordinarily violates
the APA’s requirement of prior notice and comment.141 Hickman also
has argued not only that a temporary regulation is invalid, but that
it may taint the final regulation to which it relates, assuming no APA
exception applies, such as for “good cause” or interpretative rules.142
As Hickman explains, some courts have excused APA procedural
flaws where post-promulgation comments evidenced an “open mind”
toward comments or where undoing the regulations would not make
a substantive difference.143 Nevertheless, other courts are more concerned that making exceptions will gut the APA’s notice and comment requirement.144 Hickman argues that the Court should not engender chaos by invalidating hundreds of regulations that have been
adopted in this manner.145 Nevertheless, Hickman persuasively observes that a temporary regulation adopted in the midst of litigation

136. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 700.
137. Id. at 697-98.
138. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 1836, 1852 (2012) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (no impermissible retroactivity if “interpretation” of a provision “without an
established meaning” rather than “change” occurs).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
140. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4, at 1759.
141. See id. at 1760.
142. See Hickman Brief, supra note 3, at 26. The good cause exception is intended to be
very narrow. As Hickman explains, “the good cause exception exists principally to give
agencies flexibility in dealing with emergencies and typographical errors, plus the occasional situation in which advance notice would be counterproductive.” See Hickman, supra
note 4, at 1782.
143. See Hickman Brief, supra note 3, at 27.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 28.

2013]

DEFERENCE TO RETROACTIVE TAX RULES

371

is too fundamentally flawed, because it will not foster meaningful
public participation in the rulemaking process.146
Although I generally agree with Hickman’s position, there is a
stronger argument for upholding temporary regulations, and it would
not invalidate litigation-oriented temporary regulations. The APA’s
notice and comment procedure147 makes perfect sense under a working assumption that a rule cannot be retroactive. Indeed, the APA
requires publication of a rule before the “effective date” of the rule.148
This is flatly inconsistent with the Code’s grant of retroactive rulemaking power. Under the current general grant to the Treasury of
rulemaking authority, regulations ordinarily may apply to periods as
early as the public has notice of the expected contents of the regulation.149 Moreover, under the old grant, retroactivity was the default.
If the IRS’s position is correct, the old grant applies to regulations
relating to most sections of the Code.150
If most tax regulations are legislative and the APA’s good cause
exception rarely applies, then a literal reading of the APA’s notice
and comment requirements would practically obliterate Section
7805(b). For example, the literal reading of the APA would imply that
regulations under a brand new code section cannot take effect before
the comment process has been completed and a final regulation issues, unless they are interpretative or qualify for the good cause exception, neither of which is likely. A more persuasive reading, in my
view, is that in the context of tax administration, Congress wishes to
incentivize notice to taxpayers of the rules to which they will be subject. Accordingly, the IRS should not be penalized for giving notice of
its intentions early if it then solicits comments in a reasonable manner.
To approach the matter from a different angle, consider that agencies other than the Treasury Department generally have not been
granted the authority to promulgate retroactive regulations.151 For
those agencies, the invalidation of a regulation on procedural
grounds would have more impact. Under the APA, absent a court’s
exercise of remedial discretion, the fact that the public has notice of
an agency’s intentions to make a rule is irrelevant to the permissible
effective date of the rule.152 However, this is a situation where tax is
exceptional, because the Code explicitly provides for tax regulations
with an effective date prior to the enactment of final regulations.
146. See id. at 30.
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (2006).
148. Id.
149. See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(C) (2012).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
151. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
152. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion
in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 299 (2003) (noting that courts have sometimes
exercised discretion to avoid disruptions when a rule falls to a procedural challenge).
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Assuming temporary regulations are valid, what standard of judicial deference would apply? Temporary regulations, at least for a
time, are binding. However, while the regulation is still temporary, it
will implicitly not have gone through meaningful public participation
that could be reflected in the rule. Therefore, Skidmore is probably the
correct standard of judicial deference to apply to a temporary regulation.
Home Concrete and several other cases involved a common fact
pattern.153 The taxpayers engaged in tax shelter transactions leading
to an overstatement of basis.154 In general, the statute of limitations
on assessment of tax is three years, but in the case of a substantial
understatement of income, a six-year statute of limitations applies.155
The IRS issued retroactive temporary regulations on this matter,
which were finalized after receiving only one comment.156 The regulations specified that an overstatement of basis constitutes an omission
from gross income for purposes of the six-year statute of limitations.157
Effectively, this reopened tax years that were closed, assuming that
the three-year statute of limitations applied before the regulations
were finalized.
The Supreme Court in 1958 had held that overstated basis was
not an omission for purposes of the predecessor to the current statute
of limitations on assessment.158 However, the IRS claimed Chevron
deference under Brand X.159 As discussed above, Brand X allows an
agency to adopt a construction of a statute, even if it differs from the
construction that a court has previously adopted, so long as the statute is not unambiguous. Thus, an initial issue is whether the statute
of limitations is ambiguous. Circuits split on this Chevron step 1 issue
of ambiguity.160
The Court, however, decided the case at step 1, relying on the Colony precedent.161 Invalidating the regulations as contrary to statute
rendered questions under the APA procedural rules and judicial deference doctrines superfluous. Thus, it remains unclear what the Court
thinks about validity of and deference applicable to temporary regulations in general, or retroactive temporary regulations in particular.
Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent for four justices, focused primarily on the issue of whether there was statutory ambiguity.162 Justice Kennedy argued that statutory amendments not considered in
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Lederman, supra note 3, at 679.
See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1836 (2012).
I.R.C. § 6501(a), (e)(1)(A) (2012).
See Hickman Brief, supra note 3, at 31.
Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1842.
See id.
Id. at 255-56.
See Lederman, supra note 3, at 681-87 (describing the holdings of the Circuit courts).
Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1836-37.
Id. at 1849.
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Colony left interpretive space for the Treasury’s new interpretation.163 After concluding that the statute was ambiguous, Justice
Kennedy tersely observed that the Treasury’s interpretation was
“reasonable,” citing Mayo.164 Moreover, as a “clarification” or “interpretation,” the interpretation did not “upset legitimate settled expectations” or “have an impermissible retroactive effect.”165
Thus, at least four justices in Home Concrete would have held that
Chevron deference applied to interim-final regulations that clarified
rules applying to prior tax years. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
provides very little insight into the reasoning behind the dissent’s
conclusions concerning the APA and deference doctrines, and the majority opinion does not address these issues at all.
C. Revenue Rulings
Revenue rulings are interpretations published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin by the IRS, without undergoing notice and comment. Revenue rulings generally apply rules to specific factual situations. The IRS does not claim the same authority for revenue rulings as
Treasury regulations, yet they are still binding to some degree. In general, revenue rulings apply retroactively and prospectively, unless the
IRS exercises its discretion to apply the authority prospectively only.166
Because disregard of a revenue ruling may lead to penalties, it
makes sense to think of a revenue ruling as binding, even if the IRS
labels a revenue ruling as being less binding than a regulation.167
Therefore, a revenue ruling should be procedurally valid only if it is
interpretative rather than legislative, because the ruling will not
undergo APA notice and comment or a similar procedure.
The appropriate standard of judicial deference for a revenue ruling is Skidmore. Although revenue rulings probably have enough
force of law to qualify under Chevron, they do not undergo the kind of
process that Congress would expect to receive deference.
D. Litigating Positions
The Supreme Court repeatedly has applied Auer deference to an
agency’s interpretations of an agency’s own authorities, even if the
interpretation is advanced in a brief in litigation. In Auer, the Supreme Court held that a reviewing court owed deference to the Secre-

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1850-51.
Id. at 1852.
Id. at 1853.
I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2012).
See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(1) (2012).
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tary of Labor’s interpretation of a regulation, unless the interpretation was “plainly erroneous.”168
A key issue is whether the agency claiming Auer deference is really
interpreting preexisting guidance rather than generating new guidance. An agency cannot simply “parrot” the statute it is charged with
implementing in a regulation and then claim Auer deference for its
interpretation of the statute; the agency must use its expertise to enact an interpretation that it subsequently interprets.169 In the tax
context, some regulations do little more than repeat the relevant
Code section; subsequent interpretations of those regulations should
not be eligible for Auer deference.170
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RETROACTIVITY
As this Article has discussed, certain IRS modalities may validly—at
least under the Code—take effect retroactively. This Part examines
whether this statutory flexibility is unconstitutional. In short, although there may be outlier examples, retroactivity generally has not
been suspect under the Constitution. Since the early twentieth century
Lochner-era high water mark of judicial review of economic legislation,
the Supreme Court has not found a tax unconstitutional on account of
retroactivity. In addition, more generally beyond tax, the Supreme
Court’s review of retroactivity has been extremely deferential.
Two analytical frameworks may be relevant where retroactive tax
rules impose an economic burden on a taxpayer: substantive due process and regulatory takings.171 Although the matter is not free from
doubt, the proper doctrine within which to situate review is the substantive guarantee of the Due Process Clause. That said, it makes
little difference whether one looks to substantive due process or regulatory takings jurisprudence. Under either framework, the post-Lochner
era decisions of the Court have invalidated only shockingly unfair
retroactivity involving arguably unforeseeable liabilities.

168. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
169. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
170. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a). Just because the Treasury has summarized the
Section 61 definition of “gross income” in a final regulation does not mean that its litigating positions with respect to what constitutes income will be reviewed on a “plainly
erroneous” standard.
171. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper
Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713 (2002).
Additional constitutional guarantees limit the government’s ability to impose criminal
liability for tax misconduct. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, the Ex Post
Facto Clause and vagueness doctrines will probably limit retroactivity in criminal matters
far more than in civil matters.
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A. Substantive Due Process
The latest pronouncement from the Supreme Court on the question whether substantive due process is violated by retroactivity is
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.172 The Supreme Court’s decision in Eastern Enterprises is also the perfect showcase for the question of which
analytical framework applies when new rules deprive a person of
money but not a specific property or use of property. Piecing together
the opinions in the 4-1-4 decision, five justices embraced substantive
due process as the correct analytical framework,173 but only Justice
Kennedy was convinced that the guarantee was violated by the retroactive imposition of a liability.174 The four other justices that applied substantive due process analysis concluded that even reaching
back over multiple decades to impose a new multimillion-dollar liability was foreseeable and constitutionally unassailable.175 Only four
justices looked to regulatory takings doctrine, but combined with
Justice Kennedy’s substantive due process vote, a majority held in
favor of Eastern Enterprises.176
Justice Kennedy dismissed the Coal Act’s imposition of “a staggering financial burden” on Eastern Enterprises as a trigger for the Takings Clause, because the law did not “operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and it [was] not applicable to or measured by a
property interest.”177 Similarly, the Coal Act did not “encumber an
estate in land . . . , a valuable interest in an intangible . . . , or even a
bank account or accrued interest.”178 Because the Coal Act was “indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the property
it uses to do so,”179 there was no issue under the Takings Clause.180 As
Professor Krotoszynski writes, Justice Kennedy’s test for a takings
claim appears to search for “a specific res that the government seeks
to seize or control.”181

172. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
173. Id. at 504.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 177-81.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 201-06.
176. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 503-51.
177. Id. at 540. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (“To the extent it affects property interests, it does so in a manner similar to
many laws; but until today, none were thought to constitute takings. To call this sort of
governmental action a taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise
and, with all due respect, unwise.”).
181. See Krotoszynski, supra note 171, at 745. Krotoszynski persuasively defends Justice
Kennedy’s approach and explains what is really at stake:
In Justice Kennedy’s view, the Supreme Court should avoid an open-ended
approach to the Takings Clause because it would require federal courts routinely to engage in “normative considerations about the wisdom of government decisions.” As Justice Kennedy properly notes, the Takings Clause does not limit
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As the facts will demonstrate, it is telling about the narrow scope
of substantive due process that Eastern Enterprises was such a close
decision. In 1992, Congress enacted the Coal Industry Retiree Health
Benefit Act, imposing health benefit funding obligations on entities
that employed or had employed coal miners, even in the distant
past.182 Before the act, a series of voluntary industry agreements negotiated with unions were responsible for funding health benefits beginning in the 1940s.183 By the 1970s, the market negotiated funding
proved inadequate to providing benefits to which the miners believed
they were entitled.184 In 1988, Congress, the industry, and unions began working on a plan to reform the area.185 Congress ultimately required any signatory to the prior health benefit agreements to fund
comprehensive benefits for retirees; this was true even if the company no longer operated in the coal industry.186 The requirement was
particularly a surprise for many companies because their agreements
had expressly conditioned benefits on adequate funding under the
pre-existing mechanism.187
Writing for four dissenters, Justice Breyer agreed with Justice
Kennedy that substantive due process is the correct analytical
framework: “there is no need to torture the Takings Clause to fit this
case” because “the question involved—the potential unfairness of retroactive liability—finds a natural home in the Due Process Clause, a
Fifth Amendment neighbor.”188 Applying the Due Process Clause,
Justice Breyer did not find the Coal Act’s funding provisions to be
sufficiently arbitrary or unfair to warrant invalidation. He
reached this conclusion because “the relationship between Eastern
the scope of permissible government action; rather, it merely requires the government to pay for the property interests that it takes. If the question presented goes to the basic fairness or legitimacy of the government’s policy, rather
than the question of compensation, a reviewing court should employ the Due
Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause.
Justice Kennedy’s policy arguments are quite sound and his demarcation of
the line between takings claims and substantive due process claims makes a
great deal of sense. When government acts in a way that affects a particular
property interest, and does so intentionally, expropriatory intent may well be
present. But the specificity of the government’s action vis-a-vis a property interest will not invariably indicate a government action that is tantamount to an
expropriation. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, a regulatory takings doctrine focused on the specificity of the government’s demand
could be easily evaded. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s definition of a taking does not
entirely foreclose the plurality’s analysis of the Coal Act.
Id. at 745-46 (footnotes omitted).
182. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 513.
183. Id. at 504-06.
184. Id. at 508-10.
185. Id. at 511-12.
186. Id. at 514.
187. Id. at 507-08.
188. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

2013]

DEFERENCE TO RETROACTIVE TAX RULES

377

and the payments demanded by the Coal Act is special enough to
pass the Constitution’s fundamental fairness test.” 189 The special
relationship was due to the fact that Eastern Enterprises arguably
benefited from the miners’ labor and had made promises to them to
provide health benefits, notwithstanding the fact that the promises
were legally unenforceable.190
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in contrast, purports to apply rationality review, but clearly does so with somewhat more bite than
typical rationality review. Justice Kennedy notes that due process
prevents retroactivity from being imposed in an “arbitrary and irrational way.”191 Although this may sound exactly like the lenient
standard of review typically applied to prospective economic legislation, Justice Kennedy suggests cryptically that “justifications for the
latter may not suffice for the former.”192 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy
finds the Coal Act’s retroactive imposition of liability “bears no legitimate relation to the interest which the Government asserts in the
support of the statute.”193 The thirty-five year time frame appears to
be key to this conclusion; Justice Kennedy reminds, “Statutes may be
invalidated on due process grounds only under the most egregious of
circumstances. This case represents one of the rare instances in
which even such a permissive standard has been violated.”194
Tax cases in the post-Lochner era have sounded the same permissive substantive due process themes. In the latest Supreme Court
case on retroactive taxation, the Court held that a retroactive
amendment of the estate tax did not violate substantive due process.195 In 1985, before a later amendment, the Code allowed a deduction of half the proceeds of a sale of securities to an employee stock
ownership plan.196 The scope of the deduction was a mistake; Congress
had intended to limit the deduction to stock already owned by the
decedent.197 Wilmetta Kay’s executor, Jerry Carlton, purchased millions of dollars worth of stock, which he then sold, thereby reducing
Kay’s estate tax due by approximately $2.5 million.198 The IRS published a policy of disallowing the deduction where the decedent had
not owned stock prior to death, and Congress followed by retroactively enacting the “decedent ownership requirement.”199 Thus, assuming

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 559-61.
Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 548 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 549-50.
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
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the revision was constitutional, Kay’s estate owed a large additional
estate tax liability.
Carlton’s due process challenge failed in district court but succeeded on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.200 The Ninth Circuit placed
substantial weight on the taxpayer’s actual reliance on the loophole
and lack of notice.201 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the
“due process standard to be applied to tax statutes with retroactive
effect, therefore, is the same as that generally applicable to retroactive economic legislation.”202 Specifically, “[p]rovided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of
such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches.”203
The Court found Congress’ purpose of correcting a mistake legitimate, and observed that a period of a little more than a year was a
“modest” period of retroactivity.204 Presumably, the period of retroactivity relates to the rationality of the means of effecting a legitimate
purpose. The short period at issue in Carlton made the decision easy,
in light of Welch v. Henry, which approved of a two-year period of retroactivity for a state income tax amendment, taxing previously taxexempt dividends.205 Carlton was, perhaps, even easier because it involved a correction rather than a wholly new tax, as in Welch v. Henry.
Moreover, the Court disavowed Lochner-era retroactivity cases invalidating retroactive taxes: “Those cases were decided during an era
characterized by exacting review of economic legislation under an
approach that ‘has long since been discarded.’ ”206
Although the Court has repeatedly blessed “modest” retroactivity,
it has not decided a tax case involving more than modest retroactivity.207
There is much play in the joints between two years’ retroactivity and
two decades’ retroactivity that the Court’s precedents do not squarely
address. Justice Scalia observes, however, that the majority’s approach
will allow any retroactive tax:
The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in this case
guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid.

200. Id.
201. Id. at 29-30.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 30-31 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Co. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,
729-30 (1984)).
204. Id. at 32.
205. 305 U.S. 134, 150 (1938).
206. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
207. See Robert R. Gunning, Back from the Dead: The Resurgence of Due Process Challenges to Retroactive Tax Legislation, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 312-22 (2009) (surveying lower
federal and state court cases, which have split on whether to allow multiyear retroactivity
in taxation).

2013]

DEFERENCE TO RETROACTIVE TAX RULES

379

To pass constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute
need only be “rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.” Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose,
and any law that retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction, or
increases a rate rationally furthers that goal.208

Nevertheless, Justice Scalia is probably exaggerating the weakness of
the narrow tailoring prong; the majority may not be imposing much
bite, but surely there is a nibble at the margins.
It is impossible to be sure whether Justice Scalia’s warning is
correct—that there is no substantive due process in taxation. This
Article posits that there are limits, but they are yet to be discovered.
The Court’s existing jurisprudence seems to envision a sliding scale
where there is more latitude to make clarifications and amendments
than wholly new taxes, and where pre-tax profit expectations reduce
the scope of retroactivity. For example, could a new national sales tax
constitutionally attach to transactions occurring within the last ten
years? Probably not, but the political process presumably would keep
a wholly new retroactive tax from reaching far back to burden commonplace non-tax motivated transactions. In borderline cases, where
there is simply an amendment within an existing scheme of taxation
(e.g., income, estate and gift, excise, etc.) or where there is little or no
reason absent a tax benefit to engage in a transaction, the reach of
retroactivity is less clear; moreover, it is less clear that the political
process can be relied upon to protect the taxpayer.209 Yet the Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence on retroactivity, grounded in
its permissive review of economic legislation, seems to invite just
that: the taxpayer’s protection is the political process in all cases but
those featuring the most shocking government action.
Just this year, the Court reaffirmed that a very narrow standard
of review applies to classifications in taxation. Although not precisely
on point, Armour v. City of Indianapolis210 may be telling for the
Court’s receptivity—or lack thereof—to due process claims based on
retroactivity. In 2005, Indianapolis adopted a new assessment and
payment method and forgave any Barrett Law installments (related
to apportioned costs of sewer improvements) that lot owners still
owed.211 Owners who had prepaid their entire assessment claimed
that the city’s refusal to provide a refund violated the Equal Protec208. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
209. Although the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari is not precedential, one cannot
help but consider the recent case of Miller v. Johnson Controls, 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010). In Johnson Controls, corporate taxpayers challenged a
retroactive abolition of consolidated return filing, stretching back up to 9 years, effectively
denying the taxpayers’ refund claims. 296 S.W.3d at 394; see also Gunning, supra note 207,
at 321-22.
210. 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012).
211. Id. at 2078-79.
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tion Clause.212 Applying rational basis review (without bite), the
Court concluded that administrative convenience justified failure
to provide a refund of prepaid assessments.213 Three justices, in dissent, would have held that the gross differential taxation, weighed
against the ease of processing a refund, was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.214
The Armour dissenters’ concern with gross differences in taxation
is actually a reason that supports retroactive rules—they apply the
same rules to similarly situated taxpayers.215 Prospective-only rules
give more notice, but treat similarly situated taxpayers differently.
Perhaps it is impossible to perfectly balance the values of equal
protection with due process values in taxation. The Supreme Court
appears to have left these trade-offs largely to the discretion of Congress, states, and agencies.
B. Regulatory Taking
As discussed above, although there is a shaky doctrinal basis for
doing so, in Eastern Enterprises Justice O’Connor’s four-justice plurality opinion applied the three-part test for regulatory takings first
enunciated in Penn Central to a retroactive liability for health benefits imposed on a coal mining company.216 It is unclear whether this is
simply sui generis or whether the Court will again embrace this unusual application of the Takings Clause. As Justice Kennedy noted,
the Court had never applied Penn Central except where a “specific
property right or interest has been at stake.”217
Under the Penn Central regulatory takings test, a reviewing court
must consider “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action.”218 Surprisingly, given this landscape, Justice
O’Connor regarded the Supreme Court’s essential task as making an
inquiry into basic notions of “justice and fairness,”219 which is tradi-

212. Id. at 2079.
213. Id. at 2079-82.
214. See id. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our precedents do not ask for much
from government in this area—only ‘rough equality in tax treatment.’ The Court reminds
us that Allegheny Pittsburgh is a ‘rare case.’ It is and should be; we give great leeway to
taxing authorities in this area, for good and sufficient reasons. But every generation or so a
case comes along when this Court needs to say enough is enough, if the Equal Protection
Clause is to retain any force in this context.”) (quoting Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989) (citations omitted)).
215. Id. at 2085.
216. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529 (1998).
217. Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
218. E. Enters, 524 U.S. at 518, 523-24.
219. Id. at 523.
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tionally the domain of substantive due process.220 In this regard, Justice O’Connor observes, if “severe retroactive liability [is imposed] on
a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability,
and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to
the parties’ experience,” it violates the Takings Clause.221
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion summarily checks off each element of the Penn Central test.222 First, the Coal Act’s multimillion-dollar
economic impact on Eastern Enterprises was “considerable” and
“substantial.”223 Moreover, “the company is clearly deprived of the
amounts it must pay the Combined Fund.”224 This observation about
deprivation is clearly and always true of financial exactions, and obscures the prior history of regulatory takings cases inquiring into the
extent of a deprivation of property or the use of property. The opinion
concludes that the Coal Act interferes with “reasonable investment
backed expectations” and that the “nature of the governmental action” is “quite unusual.”225 These conclusions appear to be simultaneous with one another; the action is quite unusual because it is retroactive, and it interferes with reasonable expectations because it is
retroactive. What is conspicuously omitted is an inquiry into what
expectations are “reasonable.” One could have simultaneously found
that it is foreseeable to have liability from an employment relationship in a high-risk industry, and therefore the action was not all
that unusual.
Justice O’Connor underscores that even under the Takings
Clause, the plaintiff bears a “substantial” burden.226 The trouble for
the government, or the opportunity for the plaintiff, is that in the
analysis of regulatory takings of money, the courts are in essentially
uncharted waters. Even if the burden under the regulatory takings
analysis should be approximately the same as under the due process
analysis, a court applying the test will be left with far more discretion. The institutional effect of switching from a precedent-laden area
to a new and unsettled area is, as Professor Krotoszynski explains,
potentially great:
Over time, precedents would develop that delimit how and when
government acts with expropriatory intent. As these cases begin to
accrue, judges wishing to depart from earlier precedents arbitrarily will find undertaking such a task increasingly difficult. Because
the essence of the art of judging is giving reasons in support of results, the de facto discretion of judges to apply the expropriatory
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Krotoszynski, supra note 171, at 724-25.
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 528-29.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 532, 537.
Id. at 523.
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intent requirement in an arbitrary fashion would recede over time
as the precedents defining and applying the standard became more
numerous. In the end, as Justice Frankfurter once explained, “The
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play of an
informed professional critique upon its work.”227

Thus, for deprivations of money, a regulatory taking claim may be
more powerful than a substantive due process claim. It bears repeating, however, that Eastern Enterprise’s regulatory takings analysis did
not garner five votes.
C. The Presumption Against Retroactive Application of Statutes
The Supreme Court has developed common law principles concerning whether to apply an unclear statute retroactively or only prospectively. By all accounts, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area is confusing, including continual U-turns and backpedaling over
the years. Professor Basset writes, “A careful analysis of the Court’s
decisions reveals a consistent approach to retroactive legislation—an
approach ultimately based in fundamental principles of fairness, but
which has been masked by the Court’s terminology.”228 One confusing
aspect of the decisions is superficially mandatory language that is
sometimes taken out of context.
As an example, the Supreme Court has suggested that a statute
“may not” be applied retroactively to revive an old and cold claim
that is time barred. In Hughes Aircraft, the Court in dictum approvingly referenced the conclusion of Chenault, a Ninth Circuit case that
“a newly enacted statute that lengthens the applicable statute of limitations may not be applied retroactively to revive a plaintiff’s claim
that was otherwise barred under the old statutory scheme because to
do so would alter the substantive rights of a party and increase a party’s liability.”229 Neither of these cases, however, involved a constitutional claim. The words “may not” sometimes mean simply that an
interpretation is foreclosed under a statute being interpreted, not that
the effect, if it had been clearly legislated, would be unconstitutional.
The statutory interpretation cases were not directed toward, and
should not be imported into, substantive due process or arbitrary and
capricious analysis.230 Congress has clearly provided authority for

227. Krotoszynski, supra note 171, at 767 (footnotes omitted).
228. Debra Lyn Basset, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative
Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 454 (2001).
229. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 950 (1997)
(citing Chenault v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 F.3d 535, 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1994).
230. But see, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 62-64 (arguing that factors from statutory
interpretation cases involving retroactivity should be applied to tax analysis).
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retroactive tax rules in Section 7805(b).231 Moreover, the IRS is generally punctilious about specifying the effective date for a section of
the Regulations, sometimes applying different effective dates for different paragraphs. If a tax rule is retroactive, arbitrary and capricious review should require an explanation of the need for retroactivity, and in extreme cases constitutional claims may be successful.
In sum, the Court has rejected, under one theory or another, constitutional challenges against all but the most shocking and egregious retroactivity. That is true even when the rules are completely
new. There is, to be sure, a gray area between cases that have clearly
approved two years of tax retroactivity and cases that have barely
struck down decades of non-tax retroactivity. The signals from a majority of the Court, however, suggest that a few years of tax retroactivity would be acceptable, even for a wholly new rule. Moreover, in
many situations, retroactivity will not come in the form of a wholly
new rule, but will instead be more in the nature of a clarification of
an unclear area. There may also be bad faith on the part of the taxpayer, which could lead a court to conclude that retroactivity is not
conscience shocking, fundamentally unfair, or unforeseeable under
the circumstances.
V. OUTLINE OF REFORM OPTIONS
Although the idea of combining functions in agencies is nothing
new,232 it is likely that the public would object especially to reducing
the role of the courts in the adjudication of tax controversies. To the
extent that the IRS receives deference for tax guidance—particularly
retroactive tax guidance—the role of courts diminishes. Accordingly,
this Part briefly sketches a comparison of potential reforms of the
current system.
A. No Change
The strength of judicial review as a protection for the taxpayer
depends on the government’s process in creating and disseminating
tax guidance. As discussed above, the IRS and Treasury have at their
disposal a variety of modalities in which to make policy, but some of
these modalities will receive less judicial deference than others. Although the proposition is not entirely free from doubt, tax guidance
issued without notice and comment should probably receive only
Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference. Of course, the
government is free to use notice and comment procedures and receive
Chevron deference. Thus, at least in this respect, the taxpayer’s protection from abuse primarily lies outside of the courts.
231. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b) (2006).
232. See sources cited supra note 37.
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Even though the Treasury’s use of notice and comment rulemaking process will often limit the role of judicial review of tax controversies, this does not leave the taxpayer completely unprotected. The
rights to notice and to make comments do not guarantee the best outcome to any particular taxpayer, but they do afford interested parties
a chance to air their views and to build a record more favorable to
their position. The government, in turn, must consider the comments
and have a reasoned explanation in order to survive an arbitrary and
capricious challenge. The IRS’s past procedures have been deficient,233 but the IRS has acknowledged that it will need to internalize
Mayo’s command to follow general principles of administrative law.234
Assuming that the IRS does adhere to the APA more diligently in the
future, taxpayers will have a better chance to have their views heard,
but this is no guarantee they will be pleased with the decision the IRS
adopts. And again, assuming the IRS makes better use of notice and
comment rulemaking, its actions should receive Chevron deference
from reviewing courts.
Perhaps the most powerful constraint on unfair action by the IRS
is the political process. Unlike courts, agencies are subject to oversight by Congress and supervision by the President. Therefore, the
public can indirectly bring pressure to bear on the IRS through elected officials, even though the public does not have direct influence on
the IRS. Congress has often threatened, at least implicitly, to de-fund
an agency that is not responsive to its concerns.235 Indeed, the notice
and comment rulemaking process serves an important function in
facilitating congressional supervision of the agency.236 These constraints limit the extent to which the IRS would engage in truly arbitrary enforcement of the tax laws.
Retaining the status quo has the benefit of allowing the IRS flexibility to respond to unanticipated abuse of the tax system. But that
flexibility is at the same time its curse; it is often said that American
233. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4, at 1748.
234. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, § 32.1.2.3 (2011) available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-002.html (outlining administrative law requirements).
235. See Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 493
(2009). As Feld explains:
Congressional committees can review how an agency has used appropriated
funds, but Congress cannot retrieve funds the agency has spent or committed.
Frequently, the agency and the relevant committees are continuing players,
and the threat of reduced funding in subsequent years may constrain agency
action that strays too far from congressional intent. Thus, in some cases formal
discretion over spending devolves from Congress to the executive agency with continuing informal oversight from one or more congressional committees. The threat
the committees hold concerns the power to appropriate funds for the future.
Id.
236. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 580-83 (2009)
(discussing how administrative procedures facilitate legislative monitoring).
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culture is distrustful of government, and particularly distrustful of
the taxing power.237 Given how cumbersome the federal political process is, taxpayers may not be satisfied with a political check on the
IRS. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider other potential solutions. By
process of elimination—if agency processes and the political process
are bracketed as not completely satisfactory—a solution must involve
shifting responsibility for the tax laws to the courts.
B. Restructure Tax Litigation
The current tax litigation process is byzantine, leads to forum
shopping, and obtains different results for similarly situated taxpayers.238 After the IRS has identified a deficiency in income reported on
the taxpayer’s tax return and notified the taxpayer of its finding, the
taxpayer has essentially two routes available. One option is to contest the deficiency without paying the additional tax liability; in this
situation, the taxpayer must litigate in Tax Court.239 The other option
is to pay the deficiency and then sue for a refund. The taxpayer may
sue for a refund in district court or the Court of Federal Claims.240 In
many cases, the primary reason for suing for a refund rather than
litigating in Tax Court is to benefit from having a non-specialist
judge in district court hear the case, or to be bound by the precedents
of the Federal Circuit, which apply in the Court of Federal Claims.241
In Tax Court, specialist judges will adjudicate; in refund court,
generalist judges will adjudicate. Presumably, the decision reached
by a tax specialist will often differ from the decision reached by a
generalist. Though not empirically proven, this is certainly received
wisdom among tax lawyers.242 Assuming that a drawback of allowing
courts to exercise primary decisionmaking authority is lack of expertise, that concern is less forceful in the case of the Tax Court. In other
words, its institutional advantages include independence and expertise.

237. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal
Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 243 (2005)
(“Whatever the merits of delegation in other contexts, however, one should view with skepticism delegations of authority over the ability to raise and expend revenue.”).
238. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 69 (1990).
239. See Thomas D. Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62
TAX LAW. 311 (2009).
240. See id. at 311.
241. See David B. Porter, Where Can You Litigate Your Federal Tax Case?, 98 TAX
NOTES 558, 559-60 (2003). Other factors influence the choice of forum. All three forums
have different procedural rules. See Greenaway, supra note 239, at 319-22 (discussing
pleading, statute of limitations, and other rules).
242. Cf. Greenaway, supra note 239, at 331 (“Moreover, at risk of stating the obvious,
counsel should always consider whether they want their case decided by a tax specialist, a
specialist in money disputes with the government, or a generalist—that is, a Tax Court
judge, a Court of Federal Claims judge, or a district court judge.”).
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Given these differences in Tax Court and refund courts, Congress
might enact legislation consolidating tax controversies in the Tax
Court, ending or limiting deference by the Tax Court to the IRS and
Treasury’s guidance, and instructing appellate courts to defer to Tax
Court’s decisions.243 In the 1940s, before Dobson v. Commissioner244
was legislatively overruled,245 appellate courts were instructed to defer to the Tax Court on legal questions, but the courts resisted doing
so.246 Moreover, tax and nontax law may be able to benefit from one
another; this cross-pollination would arguably be hindered by removing trials of tax controversies from generalist courts.247
Even if appellate courts were to defer to Tax Court decisions,
there would still be a range of discretion. There is a risk that an appellate court would erroneously conclude that a Tax Court decision
was unreasonable. Another option would be to simplify the appellate
system by creating a United States Court of Tax Appeals, which
would hear appeals from the Tax Court, and remove tax cases from
district court and the Court of Claims. This was proposed for other
reasons by the Federal Courts Commission in 1990.248 Besides the
benefit of additional expertise in the court, taxpayers living in different areas of the country would be subject to the same tax precedents.
Finally, another option would be to limit deference to the IRS in
small tax controversies. Income and asset limitations would need to
be considered. As the sophistication of the taxpayer increases, it is
more reasonable to charge the taxpayer with anticipating administrative change and clarification, and to cooperate proactively with
the tax administration. There may be a compliance benefit in having
average taxpayers feel that they have a real chance to contest tax
matters in court.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has drawn from general principles of administrative
law to inform questions surrounding the validity of and deference
owed to various forms of tax guidance. A focus on the unusual case of

243. Cf. Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 731, 789-90 (2002) (proposing a single tax trial court and limiting the scope of appellate review or creating a new circuit court with jurisdiction over all tax appeals). A discussion of the constitutionality of “statutory directives” is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a discussion of this problem, see Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” The Judiciary
or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV.
837 (2009).
244. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
245. See I.R.C. § 7482(a) (2012).
246. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 669-70.
247. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 590 (1994); Lederman, supra note 3, at 670.
248. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 69 (1990).
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retroactive tax rules sheds new light on more typical prospective tax
guidance. Treasury regulations promulgated with notice and comment, even retroactive regulations, ordinarily should receive Chevron
deference. Other binding authorities, such as revenue rulings and
regulations issued without notice and comment, ordinarily should
receive Skidmore deference.
The Internal Revenue Code’s unusual grant of retroactive rulemaking power to the Treasury Department means that tax administration
can be more flexible procedurally than administrative action in general. This flexibility, of course, presents a potential for abuse. Accordingly, this Article has considered potential constitutional limitations
on retroactive tax rules and has sketched potential reforms to shift
decisionmaking power back to the courts. No solution will eliminate
the potential for upset expectations in the tax administration; the
question is really what institution will be the source of clarification
and change?

